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Abstract—Embedded and mobile devices forming part of the
Internet-of-Things  (IoT)  need  new  authentication  technologies
and techniques. This requirement is due to the increase in effort
and time attackers will use to compromise a device, often remote,
based on the possibility  of  a  significant monetary return.  This
paper  proposes  exploiting  a  device’s  accelerometers  in-built
functionality  to  implement  multi-factor  authentication.  An
experimental  embedded  system  designed  to  emulate  a  typical
mobile device is used to implement the ideas and investigated as
proof-of-concept.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
The advent of the IoT has given rise to a new wave of end-
user focused embedded and mobile devices, which now form
an increasingly important part of our everyday lives. A mobile
software “app” is available for virtually any conceivable usage
senario, and often used to interact wirelessly with embedded
devices  e.g.,  environment  control,  health  or  life-style
monitoring devices. This wireless capability, in both embedded
and mobile devices, is largely what is driving the growth of the
IoT and creating a plethora of new uses. 
At  the  same  time,  the  underlying  hardware  technologies
have  also  developed  at  a  rapid  pace  e.g.,  sensor,  power
management,  screen  and  processor  technology.  Indeed,  the
devices themselves and the IoT could not make such quantum
advances if the hardware underneath did not evolve too. It can
be noted a lot of this effect is due to a high-level of system
integration. Whereby more and more technology is crammed
onto a silicon die (System-on-Chip) or PCB.
Nevertheless,  such tiered technology development creates
new  ways  and  opportunities  for  a  determined  attacker  to
compromise a device’s  security.  This is  notoriously,  and has
been historically speaking, the case with all rapid technology
progression. Indeed, the sheer significance of the problem has
justified its own label, “cyber-security”; and a variety of sub-
taxonomies. While attackers (and defenders) typically require a
deep  understanding  and  knowledge  of:  hardware  design,
software  development,  operating  systems  and  networking
technologies to effectively compromise a device or system.
Therefore, and with all of the above in mind, it is important
that  security  technologies  chart  a  similar  course;  from low-
level hardware all the way to high-level software. It has been
shown that both multi-factor authentication and accelerometer
sensors can be used to enhance authentication in the IoT [5].
Accordingly, in this work we: 
 combine these two technologies to implement a proof-
of-concept  and  multi-factor  authentication  scheme
(protocol)  using both accelerometer  offset  values  and
tap detection technology; and, 
 use  a  field  programmable  gate  array  (FPGA)  based
emulation  system  equipped  with  a  ADXL345
accelerometer and Bluetooth capability to evaluate the
ideas.  
The logic and reasoning behind the work is as follows. 
First, accelerometers are mechanical MEMs [7] structures
containing elements that are free to move, which makes them
very sensitive to mechanical stresses and manufacturing lot-to-
lot  variability.  They are also impacted by additional stresses
applied during PCB system assembly arising from component
soldering, board mounting and application of any compounds
on or over the accelerometer.  These points introduce unique
and  “device  specific”  offsets  in  axis  readings,  which  is
important  because  they,  the  offsets,  define  the  baseline  for
measuring  acceleration.  Accordingly,  accelerometers  often
incorporate  calibration  functionality  to  compensate  for  these
effects  (typically  mid-range  accelerometers),  which  is
implemented either directly in hardware or programmatically
in software. Here, offset values are established by taking many
axis  samples  to  form  an  average  for  each  axis  while  the
accelerometer is in one plane, termed one axis calibration. The
calculated offsets are then stored in memory-mapped registers
and subtracted from subsequent axis readings automatically by
the accelerometer’s hardware circuitry. 
Secondly,  tap  detection  technology  [13],  which  is  also
prevalent in mid-range accelerometers, has proved profoundly
useful  for  interaction  in  mobile  applications  and  operating
systems e.g., gesturing. Based on this, we observe tap detection
technology provides an opportunity for the purpose of multi-
factor authentication by acting as an input data source. Even
more interesting is the possibility of harnessing the signature,
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the fingerprint, of how the user interacts via tap detection. The
latter is subject of future work, however.
A. B. Paper Organization
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section
II gives a discussion of related work; Section III presents the
methodology and Section IV an evaluation; and, lastly Sections
V and VI draw conclusions and discuss future work.
II. RELATED WORK
The  following  sub-sections  give  an  overview  of  the
relevant and related work in this area; the referencing targets
the main citations fitting within the constraints and length of
this paper. 
A. ICMetrics
In  [1]  and  [2]  ICMetrics  technology  was  presented  and
proposed. The scientific principle behind ICMetrics is to derive
solely  in  software  secret  encryption  keys  and  hardware
identifiers, by statistically analyzing Gaussian distributions of
the manufacturing differences or system characteristics present
in  one  device  compared  to  another.  Possible  variations,  for
example,  are:  PCB construction anomalies;  integrated  circuit
(IC)  lot-to-lot  lithography  variations;  or,  processor  level-1/2
cache access signatures. 
Papoutsis  [3]  completed  the  most  complete  work  on
ICMetrics, where he analyzed and sought to prove the viability
of ICMetric technology. While the first practical work applied
ICMetrics to battery-powered wheelchairs to provide security
in Healthcare services in [4]. More recent work in [5] has used
ICMetrics technology with accelerometers for authentication in
a Healthcare setting. 
We build on this latest work in this paper. However, here,
and instead, we investigate the possibility of actually exploiting
the  built  in  functionality  of  accelerometers  rather  than  just
using  raw  or  post-processed  accelerometer  axis  readings.
ICMetrics actually, and naturally, emulates one of the functions
we use here for authentication regardless. And, thus providing
continuity  in  the  overall  research  ideas  i.e.,  axis  sample
averaging.
B. Physical Unclonable Functions
Similar  approaches  to  ICMetrics  are  used  in  physical
unclonable  functions  (PUFs),  which  use  on-chip  integrated
circuit lot-to-lot lithography variations to extract secret keys for
use with a challenge response protocol [6]. This technique has
been  shown  to  be  highly  difficult  to  implement  with
consistency; and usually requires some form of helper data to
generate a stable and reproducible secret key. It also requires
integration into a silicon layout, which is notoriously difficult
and once manufactured it is fixed. One of the prime benefits of
ICMetrics, and the approach taken here, is it is software-based,
while still being able to exploit hardware functionality, lot-to-
lot lithography variations and characteristics.
C. MEMS Accelerometers
MEMS  technology  [7]  is  utilized  in  a  wide  range  of
devices.  Recent  research [8–11] in the field of  sensor based
device identification has proven it is feasible to generate device
identifiers  using  accelerometer  sensor  data.  This  work  was
improved upon in [5] and applied in a Healthcare setting. Note,
the work in [5] is also the precursor to the research presented in
this paper as mentioned in sub-section A. 
Since accelerometer sensors have been shown to be useful
for security, they have naturally become a point of interest and
possible attack. Indeed, work in [12] has shown that is possible
to  use  sound  waves  to  manipulate  an  accelerometer  in  an
“acoustic attack”.
III. METHODOLOGY
The ADXL345 accelerometer, shown in Figure 1, is used in
this  work  to  implement  a  proof-of-concept  and  multi-factor
authentication scheme using both accelerometer offset  values
and tap detection technology. It has built-in registers to hold
calibration  offset  values,  which  are  used  automatically  to
compensate axis readings after  calibration. The offset  values
are stored in 8-bit twos complement format and have a scale
factor  of  15.6mg/LSB.  While  the  values  are  generated  in
software and programmed into the OFSX, OFSY and OFXZ
registers respectively.  Note,  the offset  registers do not retain
their values when power is removed or cycled; and can be re-
generated on demand in-field.
To calibrate the ADXL345 one axis calibration is required.
This orientates the part such that one axis, typically the z-axis,
is in the 1g field of gravity and other axes are in a 0g field. The
accelerometer  axis readings are then measured by taking the
average  of  a  series  of  at  least  10  samples.  The  final  three
averages represent the offset values for each of the three axes
and are stored in the OFSX, OFSY and OFXZ registers. Since
the  offset  values  are  intrinsic  to  the  accelerometer,  that  is,
innate  to  its  hardware  architecture,  while  at  the  same  time
being unique to  the overall  device  using the part.  Here,  we
propose using them directly for multi-factor authentication by
using them to form a 128-bit secret encryption key. However,
to generate a usable 128-bit encryption key it is necessary to
ensure sufficient diversity, uniqueness and length. We propose
to satisfy this requirement by 1) combining the 24-bits of the
offset register values with both a device’s 64-bit EUI network
identifier (MAC address) and zero-padding, to give a 128-bit
string;  and,  2)  post-processing  this  128-bit  string  with  a
crystallographic  function,  here  AES S-boxes,  to  ensure  it  is
cryptographically sound. 
Note, for clarity, the underlying approach deviates from the
previous work using ICMetrics in [1-2], which builds Gaussian
distributions and uses the graph parameters to generate secret
encryption keys or hardware identifiers. However, in ICMetrics
the graph's average is one of these parameters. This effectively
correlates to the ADXL345’s calibration offset values, which
are  the average of 10 or  more axis readings.  Therefore,  the
principles of ICMetrics are actually in-built into the hardware
functionality of the accelerometer. Figure 2 plots 100 readings
taken to generate the offset values for the three axes using two
ADXL345 accelerometers. It can be observed they form unique
Gaussian like distributions albeit at a low sample count.
The ADXL345 is also capable of recognizing taps, which
induce a  detectable  vibration  as  shown in Figure  3.  This  is
implemented via a number of in-built parameters, namely the
tap detection threshold; the maximum tap duration time; and
latency defining the waiting period from the end of the first tap
until the start of the time window when a second tap can be
detected. In this work, we propose to use the ADXL345's tap
detection technology to require the user to tap out the digits of
a four-digit personal identification number (PIN) to form part
of  a  multi-factor  authentication  scheme.  For  example,  1234
would correspond to: one tap, one-second time separator, two
taps, etc.  So far, both of the features of the ADXL345 have
been described, which can be used as data sources for multi-
factor authentication. Therefore, we now discuss a suitable
method  to  combine  them  to  implement  a  multi-factor
authentication scheme, which can verify whether an arbitrary
device is trusted and known. Section IV actually implements
and evaluates all of this as a whole note, the methodology is
presented  in  this  section  only.  The  first  part  of  the  scheme
requires  that  a  device  is  enrolled,  which  could  take  place
during PCB system assembly, for example. During enrollment,
a  given  device  is  calibrated  and  the  resultant  128-bit  key
recorded in a secure database and a four digit PIN generated,
which  is  supplied  to  the  end-user  later.  It  is  possible  other
protocol schemes may not require a database note. Now given
the device can re-generate its key in-field as discussed, while
the user will know their PIN, which can be tapped out into the
device. Therefore, with use of a suitable protocol a multi-factor
authentication  scheme  can  be  implemented.  One  possible
protocol solution we propose is as follows.
To authenticate a device:
 the host sends a data block of encrypted AES 128-bit
data ciphered using the device’s enrollment key, it holds
another 128-bit AES encryption key inside known only
to the host;
 when the device receives the encrypted data block, it
re-generates its 128-bit enrollment key, and if the device
is authentic it will be able to decrypt the received block
of data to get the new 128-bit AES key;
 assuming it has derived the new key, the user now taps
out their four digit PIN;
 the PIN the accelerometer works out is encrypted with
the new key and sent back to the host;
 if the host can decrypt the received block representing
the  PIN  it  will  therefore  successfully  validate  the
device. 
Thus,  a  multi-factor  authentication  scheme  is
accomplished.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  all  encrypted  plus
exploiting  the  functionality  of  accelerometers;  while
implemented all in software as per ICMetrics.
Note,  the  tapping  profile  will  also  be  user  specific  and
possible  to  analyze  and  incorporate  for  more  rigorous
authentication,  but  considered  the  subject  of  future  work.
Furthermore, the protocol and authentication routine suggested
above  is  exemplary.  Obviously,  cryptographers  versed  in
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Figure 3, ADXL345 tap detection
-0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
-0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
 Figure 4, FPGA emulation system boards
formal  protocol  design,  proofs  and  validation  may  have
improvements and alternatives. The novelty of this work is the
possibility  of  use  of  in-built  accelerometer  functionality  for
multi-factor authentication.
IV. EVALUATION
To  evaluate  this  approach  an  IoT  and  mobile  device
emulation system was  developed and replicated  three  times,
which  is  shown in Figure  4.  It  is  based  on a  commercially
available Xilinx FPGA development board (ARTY by Diligent
Inc.),  which  allows  various  smaller  PCB  modules  to  be
plugged  in  as  desired.  The  only  requirement  is  that  these
modules, known as peripheral modules (PMODs), have either
an  I2C  or  SPI  interface.  Various  PMODs  are  available  for
purchase  from  electronics  distributors;  or  they  can  be
constructed relatively easily on a 2-layer PCB.
Two PMODs are used in the emulation system on each of
the three boards: a Bluetooth PMOD and accelerometer PMOD
featuring  the  ADXL345.  While  a  complete  SoC  system  is
implemented on the FPGA using Xilinx’s  32-bit  Microblaze
processor.  This allows full software control of the emulation
system's  features  and  the  two  attached  PMODs  i.e.,  the
PMODs can be accessed directly in C code. A more rigorous
testbed setup would allow for temperature, voltage and stress
testing. However, this system design is aimed, and sufficient to,
validate the functionality of the ideas presented.
Key generation proceeds as follows. The offset calibration
routine is implemented as a dedicated C function recording 100
samples for each axis,  which can be called anywhere in the
main  execution  thread  of  the  32-bit  Xilinx  Microblaze
processor.  Initial  experiments  revealed  the  most  consistent
offset value readings are obtained when the emulation system
is placed on a hard and level surface. This also ensures the axes
are in 0g (Z-axis) and 1g (X and Y-axes) as needed. Obviously,
for  in-field  use  a  user  would  need  to  do  the  same  to
authenticate  their  device,  and  feedback  given  to  the  user  if
authentication was not successful. Once the offset calibration C
function returns the accelerometer registers, X_offset, Y_offset
and  Z_offset  hold  the  three  8-bit  twos  complement  offset
values  (24-bits  in  total).  A  synthetic  64-bit  EUI  network
identifier is used as the Bluetooth PMOD only allows a UART
interface. This is then combined with the offset register values
and zero-padded.  This  result  is  then  passed  through sixteen
AES S-boxes to get a final 128-bit key.
The key generation process described above was used for
each of the three boards to simulate an enrollment phase, and
the 128-bit keys transmitted to a host (MS Windows 8.1 laptop
running Matlab) over UART via the Bluetooth PMOD. While
three different four digit numbers were generated to simulate
user  PINs  and  stored  along  with  the  keys  on  the  host.  To
implement  the  multi-factor  authentication  scheme  the  host
encrypted arbitrary 128-bit data strings to send to the emulation
boards, and then checked the received result containing the PIN
to authenticate the device or not. The setup simply times-out if
as response is not received back note.
  We  next  investigated  whether  the  ADXL345
accelerometer could be used effectively for key re-generation
as  proposed  using  the  aforementioned  emulation  system
hardware and software setup. 
We  note  use  of  a  post-processing  function  will  always
ensure the keys are unique between devices and combination
with a 64-bit EUI network identifier. Alternatives to using S-
boxes  may  give  more  uniqueness,  and  will  be  explored  in
future work; for example using a more specific hash function
such as SHA-2 or MD6. We also observe it is possible that two
offset values for the same axis and different devices could map
to the same value. However, that combining with a 64-bit EUI
network  identifier  and  zero-padding  and  post-processing
removes how meaningful this could be to an attacker.
Besides  uniqueness,  what  is  also  important  for  key  re-
generation is robustness. That is, how consistently a device's
128-bit key can be re-generated in the field. If  this was not
possible, or a relatively low hit rate resulted, a device would
not be able to be authenticated regardless of the protocol being
used. Therefore,  to investigate key generation robustness we
recreated the enrollment keys 1000 times at 1-second intervals. 
It  was  found  that  re-generating  the  keys  resulted  in  a
94.45%  accuracy.  Predominantly  one  axis  reading  slightly
differed causing an incorrect key to be generated. We note a
deeper investigation into the likelihood and which axis, if any,
is  predisposed  to  this  effect  is  warranted.  However,  this
provides  an  idea  of  how  consistently  it  can  be  expected  a
device using the ADX342 accelerometer can regenerate its key.
  Further  improvement  could be  achieved  by employing
more values for averaging in the calibration routine (currently
100),  perhaps  programmatically  if  a  device  could  not  be
authenticated.  Another  approach  would  be  to  use  majority
voting scheme after generating a buffer full of axis calibration
offset values. However, any extra filtering and post processing
of calibration values increases the time to authentication; which
on a low performance system, perhaps a fitness tracker, could
be a potential disadvantage i.e., selling points. 
  Further  experiments  investigated  the  operation  of  the
protocol and whole system using the three emulation boards. In
Matlab the host generated an 128-bit AES encrypted data block
(second key) using the relevant stored enrollment key, which
was sent via Bluetooth to the board under test. Then the top of
the FPGA IC packaging was lightly tapped to simulate input of
a PIN. Approximately, one second between digit taps was used,
and a quarter of a second between taps forming a specific digit.
The  result  was  then  transmitted  back  to  the  PC,  and  the
received  data  (the  encrypted  PIN  with  the  second  key)
validated.
   This  multiple  factor  authentication  experiment  was
repeated  multiple times for  each of  the emulation boards.  It
was found the data was being decrypted correctly from key re-
generation; however, where the proof-of-concept system lacks
and  introduces  false  authentication  results  even  though  the
correct  PIN  was  tapped  is  in  the  tap  detection  sequence.
Further experiments and modifications proved tap detection is
highly  sensitive  requiring  tapping  to  be  implemented
consistently. Approximately, only two out of five authentication
attempts were identified correctly due to this issue.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We  have  proposed  combining  two  technologies  in  mid-
range  accelerometers  for  multi-factor  authentication,  namely
calibration  functionality  and  tap  detection  technology.  A
protocol  has  also  been  suggested  to  implement  multi-factor
authentication.  Evaluation  on  a  proof-of-concept  emulation
system has demonstrated the viability of the initial  research,
while  highlighting  the  areas  where  further  investigation  is
required. In particular, there is a need for further research into
tap detection technology post-processing.
VI. FUTURE WORK
The authors  note that  there  is  great  scope for  both fine-
tuning and expanding the idea of using built-in accelerometer
features  and  sensors  for  multi-factor  authentication  as
discussed in this work. 
As example, the latest generate of mobile devices contain
ambient  light  sensors  to  automatically  adjust  a  screen’s
contrast,  the  underlying  hardware  technology  uses
phototransistors,  which  exhibits  silicon  variability—typically
lot-to-lot—meaning  readings  vary  between  devices  for  the
same light level.
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